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This chapter examines how the relationship between the broad
institutional configurations of the German and U.S. political economies
affects the adaptation, among their firms, of innovative patterns of eco-
nomic organization.  In particular, it examines the transfer of a critical
new organizational practice, “just-in-time” (JIT) delivery, from Japan
to the U.S. and German economies.  Car producers and other large
companies have begun outsourcing the production of many sophisti-
cated subassemblies to suppliers under JIT.  Despite international mar-
kets for capital and goods and services, important differences still exist
in institutional frameworks—specifically, in corporate law and indus-
trial relations systems, the two areas most strongly influencing the
introduction of JIT delivery strategies.  This chapter argues that
although JIT delivery has been successfully diffused from Japan to
Germany and the United States, differences in national institutional
structures have created important differences in the ways that firms in
each country support the new system.  Furthermore, examining the
processes by which JIT delivery has been transferred to the United
States and Germany lends insights into the governance of innovation in
the two countries.
Innovative forms of economic organization like JIT delivery must
be supported by laws and by informal rules negotiated between firms.
Together these comprise governance structures that facilitate the flexi-
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bility and dynamism created by the new arrangements.  At the same
time, this organization creates ways to distribute important legal and
market risks.  JIT delivery is an especially problematic relationship to
organize.  The delivery of parts directly to final assembly lines that
have neither quality-control checks nor large inventories of replace-
ment parts leads to a number of well-known problems.  Some defects,
particularly nonrandom defects, can halt production and, if not
detected before use in assembly, can damage expensive capital equip-
ment or create extensive reworking costs.  Because the costs of break-
downs are often large, firms must create both legal entitlements
distributing these risks and rules establishing the technical division of
labor between companies, in particular, quality-control procedures.
Institutional frameworks influence how companies create the gov-
ernance structures needed to regulate their relationships.  Virtually all
studies of the Japanese production system emphasize that JIT delivery
emerged as the solution to a unique set of problems and opportunities
posed by the structure of Japanese markets and the institutional organi-
zation of the Japanese economy (Cusumano 1985).  Supplier relation-
ships in the United States and Germany were until recently based on
arms-length relationships between large, vertically integrated final
assemblers and thousands of small parts suppliers.  In Japan, however,
final assemblers could not attain such extreme vertical integration.
Instead, the keiretsu system of cross-ownership within industry groups
engendered long-term relationships with key suppliers.  Because these
suppliers are usually members of the same keiretsu industry grouping,
final assemblers and suppliers have an incentive to share the legal and
market risks entailed in JIT production.  As a result, Japanese car man-
ufacturers developed highly collaborative manufacturing relationships
with their suppliers.  Most of the technical governance problems
caused by JIT, such as developing robust quality-control management
procedures at supplier companies, were solved through these informal
relationships (Sabel 1993).
At least in the short term, institutional frameworks often prevent
firms from engaging in innovative forms of organization.  How and
when can such institutional obstacles be overcome, or, more usefully,
reconfigured to help firms introduce modern industrial practices?   One
solution is convergence.  This means that in order for innovative busi-
ness practices to be transferred across systems, either the relevant mar-
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ket-regulating institutions will have to be changed, or firms wishing to
implement new practices will have to opt out of national models and
create their own, largely private arrangements.  Indeed, some firms in
both the United States and Germany have adopted private contracting
arrangements between suppliers and final assemblers that mimic key
aspects of the Japanese solution, but most have not.  Instead, most U.S.
and German companies have found alternative governance structures
supporting JIT delivery that are compatible with their own institutional
environments, which differ substantially from those used by the Japa-
nese.  Furthermore, in the German case, the alternatives have been
accompanied by a substantial reconfiguration of contracting laws used
to demarcate both the legal and technical division of labor between
companies in the supplier network.  These changes represent a partial
reconfiguration (as opposed to a wholesale change) of the German
model.
The United States, unlike Germany, has a highly decentralized or
“uncoordinated” political economy (Soskice 1999).  In general, neither
business nor labor has the organizational capacity to develop or enforce
collective agreements across labor and/or business organizations.   As a
result, both the legal system and work organization framework are
decentralized and oriented toward private contracting between autono-
mous agents, in contrast to Germany’s “coordinated” business system.
In addition to the apprenticeship program and other well-known fea-
tures of the German industrial relations system, strong business coordi-
nation allows the Germans to create a qualitatively different system of
legal rules.  Under government supervision, important parts of legal
frameworks are negotiated between different business associations that
represent different corporate interests (manufacturing firms, banks,
insurers).  This system develops policy instruments that the govern-
ment can use to regulate how firms distribute legal risks among them-
selves when setting up supplier network contracts.
More specifically, this chapter makes the following arguments
about the transfer of JIT delivery to the United States and Germany.
Despite significant problems caused by prevailing supplier relation-
ships in the United States up until the late 1980s, institutional frame-
works do not create fundamental hurdles to JIT delivery.  While the
legal system does not actively promote or transfer the type of arrange-
ments needed for JIT contracting, it does allow firms tremendous lati-
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tude in designing their own agreements, which in many cases are
successful.   In the area of quality control, patterns of work organiza-
tion in U.S. plants were actually conducive to developing a new breed
of sophisticated quality management systems that facilitate JIT.  Inno-
vation, then, stems from organizations rather than institutions.
In Germany, despite a history of longer-term supplier relationships
and, through the apprenticeship system, the existence of skilled work-
ers in most factories, institutional rigidities hinder the introduction of
JIT production, at least in the short term.  German legal frameworks
actively inhibit the development of the contracts needed to manage the
risks created by JIT.  Traditional patterns of work organization are not
conducive to the introduction of quality management systems.  Fur-
thermore, gaps in the law have obfuscated what are usually very strict
legal regulations that detail how contracting risks are to be spread
among firms.  This legal uncertainty has prompted a power struggle
between final assemblers and suppliers.  Most final assemblers have
pushed responsibility for a number of new legal risks onto suppliers,
exacerbating an already difficult transition to JIT delivery.  In these
ways, Germany differs strongly from the United States case.
However, in the long term, the German institutional system has a
reconfigurative capacity that is lacking in the United States.  Elements
of business coordination, exemplified by firms bargaining within trade
associations and guided by strong government regulatory oversight,
have led to the modification of existing legal frameworks and created
new agreements to solve some of the obstacles to JIT delivery.  These
agreements have recently been packaged into a new trade association
legal framework that is being widely diffused across German industry.
In short, these legal frameworks serve as “blueprints” that firms can
use to develop complex industrial organization.  Here again, the Ger-
man case is quite unlike that in the United States.
The remainder of the chapter elaborates these arguments in detail.
The next section examines JIT delivery in the United States.  This is
followed by a section examining the problems created by the German
legal framework in adopting JIT delivery and the initial attempts by
companies to overcome them.   Then comes an analysis of the broader
processes within the German political economy that have reconfigured
legal frameworks regulating JIT delivery.   In the conclusion, I summa-
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rize the argument and restate the implications of introducing foreign
innovations in the two countries.
JIT DELIVERY IN THE UNITED STATES 
For decades, U.S. car manufacturers maintained a highly profitable
production system, and for this reason, they were slow to see the need
for change in automotive technologies during the 1950s and 1960s
when manufacturers in Japan and Germany were making advances.  An
oligopolistic domestic market structure, combined with a lack of seri-
ous international competition, allowed final producers to develop very
long (five- or six-year) product cycles of basic models and to compete
only on the basis of essentially cosmetic annual design changes.
Because of the huge size of the U.S. market, large economies of scale
could be introduced through mass production with specialized factory
equipment.  Under these conditions, it made sense for final assemblers
to become highly integrated, performing any part of the production
process where scale economies could be obtained, which meant that
most value-added work took place in-house (Piore and Sabel 1984).  
Final assemblers used thousands of suppliers, who produced very
simple parts with very little value added.  Because these parts were
simple to produce, final assemblers routinely kept large inventories of
spare parts.  Thus, quality was supplied by in-house value-added work,
and the price of parts was the main focus of competition among suppli-
ers.  Final assemblers typically signed one-year contracts with suppli-
ers.  Assemblers usually relied on a number of subcontractors for each
outsourced part to ensure fierce competition for contracts.  Kenney and
Florida (1993, p. 130) quoted a manager of a U.S. supplier company
who characterized the traditional system as follows: “The strategy was
line ’em up and beat ’em up until you get ’em to a point where they
can’t make money anymore.  Then you’ve got the best price.”
Today, to keep competitive, all car producers in the U.S. market-
place must introduce much shorter (three-year) product cycles, as well
as a wealth of new subassemblies based on quickly changing electron-
ics and chemical technologies.  Under the old system, U.S. producers
kept over 50 percent of the value added in-house.  Today they hope to
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produce no more than 20–30 percent, outsourcing the rest to suppliers
who design their own parts and use JIT delivery systems.   A number of
commentators have pointed out that the traditional U.S. supplier sys-
tem presented a substantial obstacle to implementing a modern produc-
tion system (Helper 1991; Womack, Jones, and Roos 1990; Kenney
and Florida 1993).
However, recent studies have conclusively shown that a tremen-
dous shift in the organization of U.S. supplier relationships has taken
place.  Studies conducted between 1992 and 1995 show that the United
States has caught up with Japan both in the standard length of contracts
offered to suppliers and in the percentage of suppliers using JIT deliv-
ery systems (Helper and Sako 1994), and that the United States is actu-
ally ahead of Japan in collaborating with suppliers in product
development (Ellison, Clark, and Fujimoto 1995; Liker et al. 1996).
These results are especially persuasive because similar studies con-
ducted in the late 1980s, often by the same researchers, showed sizable
deficits in each of these areas (Helper 1991; Clark and Fujimoto 1991;
Womack, Jones, and Roos 1990).
To explain how this transformation was possible, it is necessary
first to analyze the traditional system and then investigate the problems
that had to be overcome.  The old system had two major obstacles to
modernizing supplier relationships.  First, existing supplier firms were
largely unsophisticated, simple parts producers.  In the late 1980s,
because of the brutality of price competition under the old system,
these firms had few resources to invest in the advanced production
technology, design capacity, or quality-control procedures needed for
more sophisticated production.  The first problem in transforming the
system was to find sophisticated suppliers or companies capable of
becoming “full service.”  The second problem concerned obstacles to
creating effective governance structures to support JIT delivery, as well
as obstacles to other parts of new, decentralized supplier networks such
as joint product development and long-term price contracts.  This prob-
lem was exacerbated by the prevailing atmosphere of distrust between
suppliers and final assemblers, given decades of ruthless supplier poli-
tics.  Difficulties in creating effective governance structures were also
rooted in the institutional organization of the American political econ-
omy.
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As to the first obstacle, increased technological sophistication has
made it possible for suppliers to produce higher-value-added auto
parts.  This has spurred a huge entry of sophisticated manufacturing
companies into supplier markets.1   These new suppliers have the
resources to establish wholly dedicated production sites to meet the JIT
delivery needs of particular final assemblers.  Their individual plants
are usually very small.  The newest seat production plants of both
Johnson Controls and Lear Seating, the largest American JIT seat pro-
ducers, employ fewer than 45 production workers per shift; but these
small production sites are backed up by tremendous corporate
resources, including research and development facilities, quality-con-
trol and production engineering departments, large financial reserves,
and highly trained management teams dedicated to large purchasing,
engineering, and sales departments.  The nature of the supplier industry
has been qualitatively transformed since the late 1980s.  The huge size
of the U.S. market and direct investment by large foreign suppliers
facilitated this transformation.  Furthermore, as we will see in more
detail, U.S. final assemblers faced virtually no legal obligations to the
old supplier base and could easily cut ties.2
Understanding the second major obstacle—creating effective gov-
ernance structures needed to support JIT delivery—is more complex.
This requires a systematic examination of the incentives and con-
straints presented by the broad institutional configuration of the U.S.
political economy.
Laws Regulating Interfirm Relationships
In the United States, most sophisticated firms either have their own
legal departments or long-standing relationships with large private
legal practices.  Trade associations play an insignificant role in regulat-
ing the contractual dealings of companies.  Unlike in Germany, they
are for the most part uninvolved in formulating standardized contracts
or mediating disputes between companies.  While laws and court pre-
cedent influence the variety and magnitude of various risks (as in prod-
uct liability law), they generally do not provide firms with governance
structures to regulate their dealings.  Legal resources are decentralized
among companies and private law firms.  As a result of this decentrali-
zation of legal resources, the American private sector is in fact highly
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innovative, but only in providing incentives for firms to create new
legal structures facilitating new governance arrangements between
companies.  There exists no public legal infrastructure to transform
innovative private legal arrangements into industry frameworks that
can be transferred from firm to firm.  Furthermore, the U.S. court sys-
tem is limited in the type of contracts it can adjudicate because it has
no access to private information generated within complex contracting
relationships.
U.S. contract law is constructed around classical principles.  It
assumes that all parties are sophisticated agents; through the enforce-
ment of formal written agreements, it protects their freedom to contract
(Macneil 1978).  Calls for court reinterpretation of contracts when cir-
cumstances have changed, or when the bargaining power between
agents is unbalanced, are rare.3  In adjudicating most breach of contract
disputes between firms, U.S. courts usually insist on the fulfillment of
even flawed written contracts (Schwartz 1992).  Though tort law, espe-
cially in the products liability field, provides for large, often punitive
sanctions against those responsible for injuring third parties (Priest
1985), contract law does not regulate how contracting parties distribute
such liability risks.  Parties may contract them out as they see fit.  This
means that in JIT delivery and other supplier contracts, neither the final
assembler nor the supplier has preexisting legal protection against vari-
ous liability claims.
 JIT contracting does not present any fundamentally new legal
challenges for U.S. firms.  The content of the legally binding part of
JIT contracts is settled entirely by the relative bargaining power of the
parties involved, on a case-by-case basis.   Because final assemblers
continue to have tremendous bargaining power over most supplier
companies, the legal risks created by JIT are usually borne by suppli-
ers.  While JIT delivery creates a dramatic increase in risk exposure to
suppliers, from a legal perspective it does not create a dramatically new
state of affairs (Bennett 1985); suppliers always have been responsible
for damages caused by their defective products.  If a defective part is
not spotted until after use in assembly, the supplier pays supplementary
“rework” costs.  If a defective part damages the final assembler’s
machine tools, the supplier is liable for these damages as well.  JIT
delivery just increases these risks.  It also creates an incentive for sup-
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pliers to create and for final assemblers to monitor high-quality control
systems.
The Introduction of ISO 9000 Technical Norms 
Even with these clear-cut legal rules, there are some risks that can-
not be contracted out.  Most important are damages to the final assem-
bler’s reputation created when defective products reach consumers.   It
is also difficult to recover all costs from production shutdowns that
often occur under JIT delivery when systematic defects are found in
outsourced parts.  Final assemblers must add informal rules and proce-
dures to the formal contract to manage these extra risks.  When large
volumes of usually very simple standardized parts were delivered to
final assemblers, most defects could be easily spotted by workers and
simply replaced through large inventories.  Increasingly, defects cannot
be easily spotted because they are contained in more complicated com-
ponents such as brake systems, seats, or preassembled instrument pan-
els assembled by system suppliers with technical know-how that the
final assembler does not possess.  Furthermore, JIT delivery often
makes inspections impossible, either because no spare parts exist or
because parts are customized according to flexible logistical systems
with very short procurement times (often less than four hours).
Only suppliers’ direct monitoring of quality-control procedures
can solve these problems.  Final assemblers across Japan, Europe, and
North America have thus formed relationships with suppliers to moni-
tor their quality control.  These agreements vary tremendously, both in
style and legal consequences.  Japanese-owned manufacturers, both in
Japan and in U.S. transplants, rely on informal “hands-on” or collabo-
rative relationships between large quality-management staffs of the
final assembler and suppliers (Kenney and Florida 1993).   Quality
management personnel develop customized quality-control goals with
each supplier.  They routinely conduct informal audits of each supplier,
leading to suggestions for improvements.  Repeated visits by assem-
blers’ quality-control staffs, along with the threat that the contract
could be terminated, ensure that problems are solved by suppliers (see
Sabel 1993 for a more detailed description of this system).
The Japanese transplant producers have successfully introduced
collaborative quality-control projects in the United States, both with
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Japanese and U.S.-owned supplier companies (Kenney and Florida
1993, pp. 130–145).  However, these firms have three advantages.
First, they access management know-how from Japan.  Second, they do
not suffer from negative reputations caused by the mismanagement of
supplier relationships that tar American-owned car assemblers.
Finally, most Japanese transplant suppliers had preexisting long-term
relationships and, in many cases, financial and/or ownership ties with
their major customers (Kenney and Florida 1993; Abo 1994).  These
relationships allowed the Japanese transplants to re-create collabora-
tive quality-control relationships in the United States.  When dealing
with American-owned suppliers, the Japanese companies have trans-
ferred to the United States some of the private institutional arrange-
ments that in Japan facilitate trustful supplier relationships.  Toyota, for
example, quickly organized supplier associations in an effort to social-
ize their American-owned suppliers into the Japanese system of orga-
nizing supplier relationships (Kenney and Florida 1993, p. 151).  
U.S.-owned car manufacturers faced a very different situation.
After decades of adversarial “hands-off” relationships, final assemblers
lacked both organizational competency (i.e., large quality-control staffs
in the purchasing department) and experience in this area.  Further-
more, informal quality-control relationships are risky to suppliers.
Even though U.S.-owned manufacturers have systematically begun to
offer four- to five-year contracts to sophisticated suppliers using JIT
delivery, price clauses are still renegotiated yearly.  Detailed inspec-
tions of the manufacturing process by quality-control experts from the
assembler could lead to improved quality control but also expose inside
information concerning the company’s operating costs.  Given a his-
tory of opportunistic price politics, suppliers have reason to be risk
averse when contemplating collaborative quality-control relationships.
Over time, the big three U.S. car manufacturers might have been
able to develop both the organizational competencies and cooperative
supplier relationships needed to pursue collaborative quality-control
projects.  However, they have pursued a different and very interesting
course.  Sophisticated companies moving into the automobile parts
business usually already have quality management systems because
they have long been exposed to full legal liability for most damages
caused by their products.  New companies, or those upgrading from
simple parts production to full-service suppliers, have every incentive
Institutional Frameworks and Innovative Organization 103
to introduce such systems.  However, from the final assembler’s point
of view, if JIT delivery is to be used, it is necessary to verify that an air-
tight quality-control regime exists.  In a rare example of extensive
cooperation, GM, Ford, and Chrysler jointly developed an ingenious
industry framework that not only allows monitoring of each supplier’s
quality management system without detailed audits by the final assem-
bler, but also provides a blueprint suppliers can use to upgrade or intro-
duce a quality management system.  This system was later adopted by
the International Standards Organization and became the ISO 9000 set
of technical norms.
From a comparative institutional perspective, the development of
the ISO 9000 system is extremely interesting, because aspects of U.S.
work organization, which in other contexts have proven to be deficient,
have actually facilitated the development and diffusion of ISO 9000
norms throughout U.S. manufacturing.  Most blue-collar workers in the
United States have not been formally trained in industrial skills
through an apprenticeship program; instead, they learn on the job.
American industrial relations scholars have concluded that a primary
reason why a German-style vocational training system has not devel-
oped in the United States is the lack of strong employer associations or
other coordinating institutions that could jointly develop a curriculum
or, more importantly, prevent “free riders” from poaching employees
trained by other companies (Soskice 1999; Wever 1995).
When institutional or other constraints hinder the development of
one set of competencies within one part of an organization, these com-
petencies must be developed elsewhere if the organization is to survive
in a competitive market setting.  Most U.S. manufacturing firms have
no highly trained workers educated to organize their own work and
perform machine maintenance and quality-control duties.  As a result,
work organization has long been controlled by large middle manage-
ment staffs of industrial engineers, human resource specialists, techni-
cians, and quality-control experts.   Even though many U.S.-owned car
manufacturing plants now use extensive job rotation within work
groups and train workers in basic machine maintenance and set-up
tasks, there is still a broad consensus that the separation of execution
and conception that has long characterized American manufacturing
plants still exists (Turner 1991).  A similar division of work between
largely unskilled labor and large specialist middle management staff
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exists in most sophisticated supplier firms.   Hence, most suppliers pos-
sess quality-control and other managerial experts who can be used to
implement sophisticated quality management schemes.
It is not surprising that broad “scientific management” principles
were invented and widely diffused in U.S. firms, because large U.S.
corporations were heavily reliant on large middle management staffs to
organize all aspects of work (Guillen 1994).  These large staffs still
exist today and are ideally placed to implement ISO 9000 quality-con-
trol norms.  Though now diffused worldwide, U.S. car manufacturers
were among the first large companies to introduce this system commer-
cially to help alleviate quality-control problems caused by JIT produc-
tion.
The prototype for the ISO 9000 system was first developed by the
U.S. Department of Defense in the 1970s to aid its procurement deci-
sions with commercial contractors.  General Motors (GM), as a sup-
plier of jeeps and other military vehicles, had been forced to comply
with the military version of the ISO 9000 norm (Casper and Hancké
1999, pp. 964–965).  GM worked with Ford and Chrysler to reconfig-
ure the military version of the system into a quality management sys-
tem suitable for commercial use.  By the mid 1980s, the Japanese
producers had taken over more than one-third of the U.S. domestic
market.  GM, Chrysler, and Ford were each attempting to improve
quality control at its suppliers in order to introduce both the system
supplier strategy and JIT procurement.  Facing a common threat and
using many of the same local suppliers, the big three could lose little
and gain much by cooperating on designing a common quality man-
agement system for suppliers.
As this common system now stands, companies meeting different
versions of the ISO 9000 norms must incorporate modern quality-con-
trol techniques into their assembly operations.  The ISO 9000 technical
norms are not tailored to particular industries or technologies.  Rather,
they broadly cover the organization of quality management processes,
including design, manufacturing, and packaging and distribution.  Pro-
cedures examined include statistical process controls, the introduction
of quality-control inspections and record keeping within all aspects
production, machine maintenance and setup, and the introduction of
systematic quality-control meetings and suggestion programs that
include production workers, management, and design staff (Paradis
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and Small 1996).  There are different levels of certification, depending
on both the type of activities engaged in by the firm and the number of
norms actually met (Casper and Hancké  1999).
Widespread use of the ISO 9000 system has prompted the develop-
ment of certification agencies qualified to conduct ISO 9000–based
audits as well as consultants trained to help firms reorganize their qual-
ity-control system to meet the norms.
ISO 9000 certification signifies nothing about the excellence or
performance of the products of the company being evaluated.  These
qualities are inherent in the broader design of the product, of which
ISO 9000 norms say nothing.  But, the norms do ensure that a large
number of critical process controls are implemented, which minimizes
the probability that defective products will be produced and shipped to
the customer.  It is particularly important for JIT production that the
systematic introduction of statistical process controls virtually elimi-
nates serial defects, which can quickly halt production at the final
assembler.
It is not surprising that ISO 9000 norms work well in the context of
the U.S. work organization.   Workers do not need to be well trained to
participate in the system, because in U.S. firms most sophisticated pro-
cess checks, such as statistical process controls, are performed by spe-
cialists.  The introduction of documented process checks into most
routine work processes also complements job mobility within the firm
by increasing job standardization.
The overall result has been a tremendous success.  The ISO 9000
norms have helped to rapidly introduce JIT delivery techniques into the
U.S. car industry without the accompanying informal quality-control
relationships used by the Japanese.  In 1991, GM, Ford, and Chrysler
again cooperated to modernize the norm series, adding supplementary
norms specialized to mass production processes particularly prevalent
in the automobile industry.
In sum, incentives provided by the institutional organization of the
U.S. political economy combine with the often ingenious strategies of
firms to produce a viable new set of supplier network relationships.
Facing strong Japanese competition, U.S.-owned car manufacturers
rapidly reorganized the composition of their supplier chains and devel-
oped and quickly adopted the ISO 9000 technical norms to monitor the
quality control of JIT suppliers.  While the new strategies were devel-
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oped by companies, the institutional organization of the political econ-
omy facilitated the transformation.  The legal system’s free-contracting
principles acclimated companies to the harsh liability regime intro-
duced by JIT and created few legal obstacles to the rapid change in the
supplier base serving final assemblers.  The ISO 9000 system allowed
the hands-off monitoring needed to overcome a legacy of distrust
between U.S. final assemblers and their suppliers.  Somewhat paradox-
ically, ISO 9000 technical norms work so well in the U.S. industrial
context because they take advantage of large technical management
staffs that are commonly created in U.S. companies because of inade-
quacies in the vocational training system.
The next section examines the parallel introduction of JIT delivery
in Germany.  Though the problems facing companies are similar, dif-
ferences in both the legal and industrial relations systems have necessi-
tated very different strategies by large companies.
JIT DELIVERY IN GERMANY
A large literature describes how “business coordination” facilitates
collective solutions within many important domains of German eco-
nomic life, such as collective wage bargaining, training, and finance
(Thelen 1991; Streeck 1984; Wever 1995).  Other scholars have
pointed out how these frameworks often serve as “para-public institu-
tions” (Katzenstein 1989) linking private economic governance with
public regulatory oversight and support of training, research and devel-
opment, and many other areas of the business system.  While there is a
large literature connecting the organization of Germany’s political
economy to its unique patterns of industrial relations, comparatively
little analysis has been given to the German legal system.  While pat-
terns of work organization are important in Germany, the legal system
has been the primary institutional framework influencing the develop-
ment of governance structures for JIT delivery.  
Compared with U.S. law, German law provides a fundamentally
different legal context within which firms in supplier relationships
must regulate their dealings.  In the U.S. case, the legal system was
largely benign, neither promoting nor hindering the development of
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contracting structures suitable for JIT delivery.  German companies, on
the other hand, faced important legal obstacles when first organizing
JIT delivery relationships in the mid 1980s.  These obstacles made it
difficult for firms to create the necessary legal structures to manage
risks.  They also combined with incentives produced by the German
industrial relations system to hinder the development of adequate qual-
ity-control arrangements within supplier firms. 
Recently, some German firms have engaged trade associations and
other para-public institutions to reconfigure some parts of this legal
framework, an ability of the German political economy lacking in the
United States.  The ultimate aim of this section of the chapter is to
explain how and when these agreements emerged.  First, however, the
section examines the broad character of German legal frameworks reg-
ulating supplier networks, how these laws affect companies trying to
organize governance structures needed for JIT delivery, and finally, the
private, short-term strategies that companies have developed to solve
these problems. 
Legal Problems Caused by JIT Delivery
Germany’s coordinated system of economic governance facilitates
the creation of a qualitatively different type of legal environment than
exists in the United States.  While “good faith” principles have long
dominated German commercial law, the broad reorganization of the
German economy along “social market” principles after World War II
solidified its protective nature.   While German law allows large com-
panies extensive freedom to design contracts with other large compa-
nies, it strongly regulates contracts between large and small
companies.  The 1976 passage of the law regulating standardized con-
tracts (AGB-Gesetz) created a broad tool that courts have used to
police contracts between large and small companies.  Before imple-
mentation of the AGB-Gesetz, powerful firms could redesign standard
legal entitlements to their advantage and force smaller firms to accept
their terms.  The AGB-Gesetz provides a legal instrument courts use to
control the types of contractual burdens placed on users of preformu-
lated contracts.  The general principle of the AGB-Gesetz is that a pre-
formulated clause violates Article 9 of the law when, for economic
motives, the contract clause shifts contracting risks in favor of the party
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writing the contract by inappropriately modifying contract laws set out
in standard German civil and commercial law.  The most sophisticated
supplier chains in the automobile industry still involve dozens, if not
hundreds, of firms.  As a result, even very complicated long-term con-
tracts regulating relationships with JIT suppliers are often preformu-
lated by the final producer and therefore fall under the scrutiny of the
AGB-Gesetz (Grünewald 1995). 
Though the technical organization of JIT delivery in Germany is
similar to that in the United States, differences in the legal context
mean that the same JIT delivery relationships that cause no legal prob-
lems in the United States create substantial difficulties in Germany.
Articles 377 and 378 of the German commercial code (HGB) contain a
nearly 100-year-old law requiring that the (final assembler) undertake a
“speedy and thorough” examination of all goods upon delivery.  This
law limits suppliers’ liability when inspections do not take place.  In
such cases, the final assembler loses all warranty rights and must
assume partial responsibility for product liability damages.4  Because
liability cases routinely end in multimillion–deutsche Mark settle-
ments, these legal entitlements are important to the firms involved.  
The problem is that the essence of JIT logistical systems is delivery
directly to the assembly line for immediate use.  Final assemblers
argue that the technical organization of JIT precludes them from per-
forming their duties under Articles 377–378 HGB.  However, because
the “entry inspections” carry with them critical legal entitlements,
eliminating them creates a conflict of interest between final assemblers
and suppliers concerning the distribution of liability risks associated
with defects. 
From the final assembler’s perspective, if contracts shift the legal
responsibility for Article 377–378 HGB inspections to suppliers, sub-
stantial liability burdens are also shifted onto suppliers.  Final assem-
blers could demand compensation for both parts and wages incurred in
the assembly and the repair of products found faulty due to defects in
parts supplied via JIT delivery.  Under the old system these defects
would be spotted by entry inspections, and legal liability would lie with
the assembler.  Suppliers would find themselves liable for damages in
product liability cases where random defects in parts slip through the
production process unnoticed and later cause harm to customers (Grof
von Westphalen 1990).  Supplier firms turn this logic around.  They see
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no reason why liability risks should be shifted towards them because
final assemblers chose to forego historical legal obligations.5
Patterns of work organization in small German firms compound
the legal problems.  Most German workers are highly trained and
spend their entire career with one firm.  Quality control at most Ger-
man manufacturing firms is good, but idiosyncratic.  Instead of system-
atized routines developed and implemented by management
specialists, skilled workers in German firms usually developed their
own quality-control procedures (Schmidt-Salzer 1996; see also Thelen
1991 and Turner 1991 for more on German work organization).  Qual-
ity-control routines were rarely systematized into formal procedures or
supplemented by detailed record keeping.  Because the same work
groups often survived for decades, informal routines were enough: new
recruits could easily learn such procedures from the existing cadre of
workers, usually during their three-year apprenticeship.  Over the long
term, supplier firms could not rely on the strong legal protection from
liability damages provided by Articles 377–378 HGB, because their
customers could always stop doing business with them if they had con-
tinuous quality-control problems; but when introducing new products
or work procedures, the law provided short-term protection from qual-
ity-control problems.
In the 1960s and 1970s, the German auto parts industry was similar
to that in the United States.  Most supplier plants produced large quan-
tities of standardized parts.  As a result, the work process was fairly
simple.  Workers were highly skilled, responsible for setting up and
maintaining their machines, setting cycle times, and performing quality
control according to very effective but often highly idiosyncratic sys-
tems.  However, in the 1980s and 1990s, as part of the broad switch to
the JIT supplier strategy, many supplier firms in the German automo-
bile industry attempted to upgrade their manufacturing processes to
win more lucrative contracts for more complicated components or, in
some cases, complete subassemblies.  For most suppliers, this involved
a major redesign of the work process.  The new procedures contained
more steps.  Furthermore, many suppliers had to create flexible manu-
facturing processes that met different product specifications.  This
change in processes was an essential part of the JIT strategy.  
Because the old informal quality-control procedures often cannot
meet the demands of a more complicated work process, suppliers are
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now more likely to suffer quality-control problems, with their inherent
liability problems.  But at the same time, most suppliers have been
asked to sign a new breed of contract that cedes their traditional Article
377–378 HGB protection against important liability risks.  
The Creation of “Quality-Control Agreements” 
by German Final Assemblers
In the short term, the uncertainty of existing laws has created a
void that firms must fill with their own contractual structures.  To a cer-
tain extent, this creates a bargaining game not unlike that in the United
States.  Strengthened by their bargaining power over suppliers, final
assemblers in the German car industry can create new contracting
structures as they see fit.  However, they must remain mindful of the
likely legal validity of their interpretations should they come under
judicial review.  Most of these firms use standardized contracting struc-
tures, which fall under the purview of the AGB-Gesetz.      
When developing JIT delivery contracts, most of the German car
manufacturers combined legal clauses with technical agreements regu-
lating quality control.  German business practice is for the most part
similar to that in the United States in that technical aspects of supplier
relationships (such as product specifications or quality-control stan-
dards) are normally separated from the formal contract that distributes
different legal and market risks.  However, faced with the combined
problems of developing a more complicated division of technical labor
with suppliers and solving the legal uncertainties caused by JIT deliv-
ery, the legal departments of most German final assemblers have joined
forces with their quality-control experts to create comprehensive “qual-
ity-control agreements” (Qualitätssicherungsvereinbarungen, hence-
forward “QCAs”).
These agreements usually contain formal abrogations of Article
377–378 HGB inspections, other legal or quasi-legal rules covering
warranties and product liability responsibilities, and provisions for set-
tling various problems, such as delay in delivery due to traffic and
rework costs.  In addition to product specifications, technical provi-
sions contain numerical goals of acceptable error rates and outline the
type of quality-control system to be maintained by the supplier.  From
the late 1980s onwards, most final assemblers adopted the same ISO
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9000 norms used in the United States (Casper and Hancké 1999).  The
final assembler takes responsibility for monitoring whether or not these
goals are being met and helps deficient suppliers upgrade their quality-
control systems.
While most of the German car producers have set up QCAs con-
taining abrogations of Article 377–378 HGB inspections, important
details in their implementation dramatically influence their actual con-
sequences (see Casper 1996 for case studies).  The high-end specialist
producer BMW, for example, organizes collaborative quality-control
relationships that are similar to those of Japanese-owned producers.
BMW sends its own auditors to perform supplier certifications, which
are supplemented by product technology checks that differ substan-
tially across different types of producers (e.g., textile versus metal-
working or electronic technology).  Most of the other German car pro-
ducers pursue more formal quality-control arrangements that look
more like those in the United States.  Suppliers sign legally binding
contracts abrogating Article 377–378 HGB rights allowing “zero
defects.”  They are then supposed to introduce a quality management
system specified by the final assembler to achieve these goals.  Because
the ISO 9000 system is ideal for monitoring quality control across a
diverse array of firms, this is the system used by all final assemblers.
German final assemblers have a strong incentive to designate as
many firms as possible JIT suppliers and ask them to sign QCAs
because it substantially shifts legal risk from their responsibilities.
Volkswagen, for example, has recently designated all suppliers making
a customized part for VW as JIT.  When setting up a new production
facility in East Germany, VW explicitly organized its new production
site along decentralized production principles.  Volkswagen has four
JIT suppliers in the area.  Deliveries occur several times a day with
substantial variation in product specifications.  Nine other suppliers
deliver complicated but standardized subassemblies on a daily basis.
Then there are more than two dozen other local suppliers, most of
which make simple stamped parts that are delivered anywhere from
daily to weekly.  All these firms are officially JIT suppliers that must
face the full gauntlet of new legal risks (see Casper 1997 for more on
this case).
Because they are an entirely new breed of contract, QCAs have
fostered an intense legal debate in Germany.  The key issue is whether
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the Article 377–378 HGB abrogations contained in these documents
violate the AGB-Gesetz.  Lawyers working for final assemblers argue
that they are in effect carrying out Article 377–378 HGB obligations
through both stipulating desired quality-control targets and practices to
be carried out by suppliers and then monitoring their enactment.
Because QCAs substantially improve quality control within supplier
firms (to the high levels sufficient for JIT delivery), final assemblers
suggest that QCAs make entry inspections superfluous.
Though a number of related court cases point to the interpretation
that some QCAs violate the AGB-Gesetz, there has as yet been no spe-
cific individual precedent (Casper 1996).  This is in part because Ger-
man parts producers value their long-term supplier relationships more
than the possible short-term gains that might be won in a court deci-
sion.  However, coordinated German supplier companies have other
policy instruments at their disposal that American companies lack.
Important parts of the industry frameworks governing JIT delivery are
being reconfigured to solve some of these problems.
Reconfiguring German Industry Frameworks 
“Private lawmaking” has long formed a central part of German
associational law.   A key difference in the German (relative to Anglo-
American) legal system is that in German law, voluntary associations,
such as trade associations, have also been allowed to partake in a cor-
porate character and develop strong legal roles and responsibilities
(Hueck 1991).  Although trade associations in both the United States
and Germany have legal departments, those in Germany are much
larger and more specialized than those in the United States.  In addition
to providing services for individual member firms and lobbying the
government, trade association lawyers have developed model firm-
level contractual agreements.  Industry frameworks serve as legal tool
kits, helping companies develop the contracting structures needed to
set up innovative business dealings.  Until recently, these contractual
models were usually fairly simple buying or selling agreements (allge-
meine Geschäftsbedingungen) that small member firms without legal
resources could use to set up legally secure business deals.  But as the
proportion of firms setting up more complicated business ventures has
increased, trade association lawyers have attempted to develop more
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complex model contractual agreements.  Though many of these ven-
tures have failed due to lack of consensus among member firms, there
have been some successful agreements. 
The German Cartel Office is charged with reviewing all proposed
industry agreements to assure that agreements break none of Ger-
many’s cartel laws.  Because of the tightening of German cartel law
after World War II, these reviews are very strict.  Any trade association
agreement whose implementation can foreseeably restrict future com-
petition within a market can be struck down.  The principle of volunta-
rism is at the center of this review, because any model contractual
agreement in which participation is binding will be voided.  As a result,
bargaining within trade associations is usually based on consensus.
Where conflicts of interests prevail within a trade association, negotia-
tions will often fail.  
The institutional capacity to develop collective solutions to some
of the problems posed by JIT delivery is fragile.  Even though quality
control agreements were first widely used in the German auto industry,
conflicts of interest between final assemblers and suppliers have pre-
vented new industry standards from emerging in this sector.  Most Ger-
man car producers oppose the development of a standardized QCA
within the Verband deutsche Automobilindustrie (VDA).  The hierar-
chical industrial organization of the automobile sector explains why
final assemblers can so easily develop standardized QCA agreements
and then present them to suppliers on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.  
Instead, an important industry agreement has emerged elsewhere.
Though QCAs were initially used most intensely within the auto indus-
try, they have also been employed by companies in other industries
with complex supplier relationships.  This is particularly true in other
advanced technology sectors, such as the machine tool and electronics
industries.   The trade association representing the electronics industry
(ZVEI) has recently developed an important QCA framework that is
changing the contours of the JIT delivery debate throughout Germany
industry.
Patterns of business coordination are more vibrant in the electron-
ics sector because of its organizational features and the technologies
involved.  First, most firms are small or medium in size.  Relationships
with suppliers are typically more balanced because of this greater
equality in size.  Therefore, individual firms can seldom impose their
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preferred contractual solution on their supplier partners.  Furthermore,
the largest two firms in the sector, Bosch and Siemens, are both suppli-
ers and final producers.  Their dual role has tempered their willingness
to write overtly opportunistic QCAs.  Lawyers from Siemens actually
played a key role in developing the ZVEI framework.  
Technological factors have also played a role.  Articles 377–378
HGB only mandate a “feasible” inspection for “visible” damages.
Because most electronic parts are microscopic, this limits a feasible-
entry inspection.  Most firms agree that they should include inspections
for obvious physical damages and assurances that products are prop-
erly labeled.  But because more detailed inspections cannot take place,
the supplier must assume liability for other defects.  Because of this
naturally clear-cut distribution of liability risks and inspection duties,
conflict over Article 377–378 HGB inspections is not as great in the
electronics sector.
The ZVEI agreement obliges final assemblers to conduct simple
Article 377–378 HGB entry inspections, which creates a clear bound-
ary to the risks that must be accepted by suppliers.  Entry inspections
include checks for transport damages and limited examinations of
products to check for visible defects. This modified version of Article
377–378 HGB entry inspection is based on a legal interpretation by
ZVEI lawyers, supported by German High Court cases, that final
assemblers cannot be expected make entry inspections that demand the
development of special expertise or resources (Grünewald 1995).  In
the electronics industry, the vast majority of errors can only be found
through detailed testing of integrated circuits contained in electronic
devices.  For this technological reason, most supplier firms have
adopted detailed quality-control checks into their production pro-
cesses.  Simple spot checks by final assemblers are all that is required
to fulfill Article 377–378 HGB obligations.  These nominal entry
inspections prevent final assemblers from labeling supplier relation-
ships as “just-in-time” purely to serve opportunistic legal strategies that
would limit liability through Article 377–378 HGB abrogations.
The agreement also contains supplemental provisions pertaining to
the supplier’s quality-control system.  Like all QCAs, the ZVEI agree-
ment obliges supplier firms to set up a quality management system.
However, the precise specifications of this system are determined by
the parties to the agreement themselves.  ZVEI representatives suggest
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that most firms will simply use the ISO 9000 norm series most suitable
to the technical specification of the supplier’s production process, but
firms have the option of setting very detailed customized agreements to
provide for unique cases.
Overall, the most important attribute of this industry framework is
that it creates a reasonable solution to risk distribution issues, through
modified exit inspections.  Companies using it can direct their energies
towards developing the customized supplemental agreements, without
fear that these informal parts of their QCA will radically reshuffle con-
tracting risks or break important legal codes.  This elasticity shows that
it is not only possible to develop complex contracting structures within
Germany’s associative governance system, but also to structure these
agreements so as to place broad limits around the risk distribution
issues that often undermine complex contracting relationships.  
Furthermore, the ZVEI agreement contains a workable blend of
standardized contract terms and supplemental agreement provisions
that allow for relationship-specific concerns.  The standardized legal
terms maintain standard legal entitlements.  This brackets off negotia-
tion over many contentious risk distribution issues and assures integra-
tion of the agreement with broader German legal codes.  Supple-
mentary agreements negotiated by the parties themselves allow some
of the relational contracting flexibility that can customize innovative
and complex economic relationships.
The ZVEI agreement is one of the most promising examples to
date of developing a complex contracting structure within the German
associational governance system.  Though its review by other trade
associations and by the Cartel Office was only completed in January
1995, early signs indicate that it may become widely used within Ger-
man industry.  In the first part of 1995 alone, the ZVEI received over
10,000 requests for copies of the agreement from companies, trade
associations, and others.  Though there are as yet no statistics on actual
usage, interviews suggests that knowledge of the agreement within
firms is high, even in non-electronics-related sectors (Casper 1996).
For example, the lawyer specializing in contract law within the
VDMA, the influential trade association representing the machine tool
sector, noted in an interview that the agreement will become a model
solution to the Article 377–378 dilemma within German law, stating
that it has already been adopted by some machine tool producers.
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If the ZVEI agreement is broadly used in the electronics and
machine tool industry, it might soon spread to the auto industry as well.
This will first happen when powerful suppliers with monopolies on
important technologies begin to insist that the ZVEI agreement, or
QCAs closely modeled after it, be used in their contract relationships.
In the longer term, however, court precedents will play a major role.  If,
as many German legal scholars predict, the standardized QCA agree-
ments used by most final assemblers are found to violate the AGB-
Gesetz, then the ZVEI agreement will begin to look like an increas-
ingly attractive alternative.  
 CONCLUSION 
Innovative organizational practices can be transferred among
nations with varying national institutional frameworks.   The JIT deliv-
ery case shows that, in the face of intense international competition
from Japan, companies can engage company organizational structures
as well as broader institutional resources existing within their political
economies to create new solutions.   Companies in Germany and the
United States have created viable governance for JIT delivery, but the
organization of these governance structures and the way they are regu-
lated within national legal systems differ.
In the United States, the legal system played a passive role and the
system of industrial relations, in a somewhat perverse way (because
inadequacies of the United States vocational training system were a
facilitating factor), provided an ideal setting for the transfer of ISO
9000 quality-control norms from the military procurement system into
private industry.  In Germany, the highly regulative legal system cre-
ated important institutional constraints.  These constraints were first
overcome by the development of quasi-legal quality-control agree-
ments in the auto industry.  While the end result in many cases looks
similar to the arrangements used in the United States, in Germany
these agreements are embedded within an entirely different legal con-
text.  In Germany, quality-control norms were formally merged with
legal clauses to allow final assemblers to transfer important liability
risks to supplier firms.   This was facilitated by gaps in the law and by
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the asymmetrical distribution of bargaining power between final
assemblers and suppliers.  Industry frameworks are now being devel-
oped within trade associations to reregulate JIT delivery within tradi-
tional contract law restrictions concerning the distribution of liability
risks.
The distinction between “coordinated” and “uncoordinated” politi-
cal economies allows us to understand key aspects of the these differ-
ences.   In the United States, the lack of coordinating mechanisms
means that industries cannot quickly adapt regulations supporting
innovative business organization (for example, trade associations are
not in a position to incorporate innovative changes into industry frame-
works).  Part of the reason why JIT spread quickly in the United States,
even without this advantage, was the lack of highly regulative laws.
Furthermore, companies had developed considerable private technical
and legal resources that allowed them to compete on the basis of inno-
vative governance structures.  In this context, it is no surprise that the
ISO 9000 norms were reorganized for commercial use in the United
States.  The drawback is that firms must create their own legal frame-
works and cannot gain transaction cost advantages by cooperating
within powerful trade associations.  Because firms must create their
own system of property rights, at least in terms of how contracting
risks are managed, the contracting process is often contentious. 
The German system allows key aspects of the governance struc-
tures used for new patterns of industry organization to become incorpo-
rated into public legal frameworks.  We have seen how this mitigates
some of the risk distribution issues that firms face.  Commentators have
long noted the importance of the small firm sector in Germany (Acs
and Audretsch 1993; Vitols 1995).  Germany’s regulative system of
contract law helps shield small companies from important market and
legal risks.  This is an important institutional factor influencing patterns
of industrial adjustment.
However, highly regulative legal systems are likely to unravel
quickly in the face of innovative forms of business organization.  This
is precisely what happened in the JIT delivery case.  In this context, the
“reconfigurative capacity” made possible through the system of busi-
ness coordination becomes a driving feature of the German political
economy.  Courts and other state actors cannot predict the forms of
industrial organization that large companies will adopt or the gover-
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nance structures they might need to manage complex relationships.
However, we have also seen that when the Article 377–378 HGB liabil-
ity law is applied to JIT delivery contracts, the same large companies
lose important legal rights.   A fascinating aspect of the German law-
making process is that the large companies that are disadvantaged by
contract law are simultaneously the pivotal actors in creating and legal-
izing new frameworks.  
Large German companies create industry frameworks because the
governance structures they contain in their organization help socialize
the cost of competing internationally and at the same time limit domes-
tic competition over governance structure innovation.  Instead of com-
peting privately to create new legal and technical arrangements, many
large companies engage trade associations to collectively develop and
legalize new legal and technical arrangements for them through the
associations’ links with the state.   So long as the gains from these
activities outweigh the costs, large German companies will continue to
engage trade associations.  However, we have seen that in the auto
industry, distributional issues have caused a breakdown in trade associ-
ation bargaining.  Only in the electronics sector, where differences in
industrial organization and technology have created a more favorable
setting, has a new trade association been created.
Notes
1. These include large American technology companies such as TRW, which has
become one of the largest suppliers of instrument panels; Japanese transplant sup-
pliers servicing both Japanese and U.S. final assemblers; former parts divisions
from the big three producers, which have been spun off into private companies;
and many traditional suppliers that have managed to upgrade their competencies.
2. Though there unfortunately exist no studies of this trend, it seems likely that many
of the old parts suppliers were consolidated through mergers and acquisitions into
larger firms able to meet the new market conditions.
3. This has led to a major debate within the legal studies field, spurred by the most
recent version of the Uniform Commercial Code, which makes “good faith” a
central tenet and thus gives ample legal precedent for courts to take a more activist
stance if they so choose (Schwartz 1992; Dawson 1983).  The most persuasive
analyses locate this reluctance to reinterpret the law squarely in the broader frag-
mented organization of the U.S. business system.
Institutional Frameworks and Innovative Organization 119
4. The law states that if the purchaser had properly performed its duties under Arti-
cles 377–378 HGB, visible defects would have been found and the future dam-
ages avoided (Grünewald 1995).
5. Some legal experts argue that through the incorporation of statistical process con-
trols into inspection systems, final assemblers can still perform entry inspections
that satisfy Articles 377–378 HGB while maintaining JIT delivery (Grünewald
1995).  Though such checks might decrease the overall efficiency of a firm’s JIT
logistical system, they would satisfy legal requirements and maintain a traditional
allocation of risks between suppliers and final assemblers.
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